Always Take A Second Look
The case for always double-checking election results is easily made: once we conduct audits, for all elections, more expensive recounts won't be necessary because hacks will be discovered. And if hacking won't work, it won't be done.
Sure, if an election is close, we'll occasionally have to conduct a full recount, but in 99% or perhaps 98% of cases, a simple, statistically relevant audit that samples the paper ballots in question will do.
Okay, you say, but is there really a likelihood of hacking that we need to address? Can't we just trust election results?
No, we can't trust, and yes, there really is a likelihood. There are some very deep dives on this subject that you can find by googling "hacking election threat" or something similar. Here's the much shorter version:
* voting machines that do not use re-countable paper ballots should be replaced
* even if a tabulating machine that is fed paper ballots is not connected to the internet, it can be infected with malware when the state installs the paper ballot template prior to an election
* thus, an entire state's voting tabulators, or just a few, could be instructed to change every 30th vote, or to undercount when reporting the result, or whatever the hacker is aiming for
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